Criminal Procedure - Mississippi\u27s New Procedure for Raising Ineffective Counsel Claims - Read v. State by McDaniel, Kent
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 4 Issue 2 Article 18 
1984 
Criminal Procedure - Mississippi's New Procedure for Raising 
Ineffective Counsel Claims - Read v. State 
Kent McDaniel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
4 Miss. C. L. Rev. 381 (1983-1984) 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Mississippi's New Procedure For
Raising Ineffective Counsel Claims - Read v. State, 430 So. 2d
832 (Miss. 1983).
FACTS
On May 24, 1980, John and Cathy Read were arrested for
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance when a
search of their house in Jackson County yielded over 5,000 dosage
units of various drugs. The Reads were jointly indicted, tried,
and convicted in the Circuit Court of Jackson County for posses-
sion with intent to deliver a controlled substance. John Read was
sentenced to serve 15 years in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections and pay a fine of $15,000. Cathy Read
received a 10-year sentence plus a $5,000 fine. The Reads were
represented at the trial by four attorneys, two from Florida and
two from the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The Reads appealed to the
Mississippi Supreme Court and assigned five errors in the trial
below.'
The supreme court examined all five assignments of error and
found four of them to be without merit, based upon the record.
The fifth assignment of error was that the Reads were denied ef-
fective counsel. The court was unable to resolve this issue based
solely on the record before it. Therefore, the court affirmed the
conviction "without prejudice to the Reads' right via proper
postconviction proceedings to litigate fully, if they wish to do so,
their claim that at trial they were denied the effective assistance
of counsel."2
In deciding Read v. State in this particular manner, the
Mississippi Supreme Court established a new procedure for rais-
ing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.' This new pro-
cedure is largely a clarification and consolidation of the previous
piecemeal system for challenging a criminal conviction based upon
the ineffectiveness issue.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
A. Effective Counsel as a Right
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raise many difficult pro-
cedural and substantive issues. Since 1932, when the United States
Supreme Court issued its ruling in Powell v. Alabama,' courts
have been faced with the proposition that the sixth amendment
1. Read v. State, 430 So. 2d 832, 833 (Miss. 1983).
2. Id. at 837.
3. This note deals solely with the ineffective assistance of counsel issue, beginning with Part II. page
836, of the opinion.
4. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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right of counsel includes the requirement that such counsel must
be "effective."5 While Powell required court appointment of ef-
fective counsel in most, if not all, capital cases,6 that right was
not extended to all criminal prosecutions until Gideon v.
Wainwright7 was decided in 1963.
It is reasonable to assume that the broad sweep of the Gideon
decision resulted in a rapid increase in the number of attorneys
who were pressed into service to represent criminal defendants.
The Gideon decision was probably the single greatest cause for
a sudden growth in the 1960's of the number of challenges citing
ineffective counsel as grounds for reversal of criminal convic-
tions.8 Statistics gathered from the reported decisions of the federal
circuit courts of appeals show an increase in the number of inef-
fectiveness claims being made to those courts by criminal
defendants. 9
Several commentators believe that at least some claims of inef-
fective counsel are justified." For example, the low pay for ap-
pointed counsel" and the youth and inexperience of many criminal
lawyers" are cited as primary reasons for the need to closely ex-
amine ineffectiveness claims. Further support comes from Chief
Justice Burger of the United States Supreme Court. While he was
serving on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, Judge Burger told the American College of Trial
5. id. at 71.
6. Id.
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8. Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, New Problems, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 443,
444-45 (1977). The author notes that at approximately the same time Gideon was decided, the U.S. Supreme
Court was expanding defendants' postconviction collateral attack alternatives and was extending other due pro-
cess guarantees to defendants. The result was that the criminal trial became more complex and defendants had
more avenues for attacking convictions at precisely the time when more attorneys, some perhaps ill-equipped
as criminal lawyers, were working on criminal cases.
9. Id. at 445 n.8. Professor Strazzella makes a compelling argument by demonstrating that incompetent
counsel claims in the federal circuits increased 262% for the period 1969-71 compared to 1963-65.
10. Even a cursory search of the literature on this subject will reveal over three dozen law review articles
and extensive annotations published in just the last few years. See, e.g., Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 299 (1983); Schwarzer, Dealing with
Incompetent Counsel - The Trial Judge s Role, 93 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1980); Comment, Ineffective Counsels
Last Act Appeal?: An Ethical Dilemma of Conflicting Interests, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 595; Special Project, Inef-
fective Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction: Principles of Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 1 (1977); Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1053 (1980); Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Lingering Debate, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 659
(1980); Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After
United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752 (1980); Annot., 15 A.L.R. 4th 582 (1982); Annot., 2 A.L.R.
4th 27 (1980); Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 218 (1976).
1I. Williams and Bost, The Assigned Counsel System: An Exercise of Servitude, 42 Miss. L.J. 32, 38-39
(1971) (comparing assignment as counsel to slave labor with its inefficiency and lack of incentive).
12. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal
Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289, 306-07 (1965) (dealing with youth and inexperience as major "intrinsic ineffec-
tiveness" factors among lawyers in criminal trials).
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Lawyers: "I find no pleasure in saying to you that the majority
of lawyers who appear in court are so poorly trained that they
are not properly performing their job, and that their manners, pro-
fessional performance and ethics offend a great many people." 3
Even when specific reasons for suspecting the effectiveness of
counsel are not expressed, virtually all of the commentators, by
the solutions they offer, make it clear that they believe a real prob-
lem exists." They almost unanimously agree that some mechanism
must be developed whereby the courts can ensure that a criminal
defendant is adequately represented. This is true even though there
is substantial disagreement over what constitutes ineffective
counsel. This latter question relates to a substantive issue that must
be addressed before procedural solutions can be meaningfully
discussed.
B. What is effective counsel?
As courts have dealt with the ineffective assistance of counsel
claims since Powell and Gideon, they have developed a number
of standards as to what constitutes ineffective counsel. This diver-
sity of standards is due in some measure to the previous reluc-
tance of the United State Supreme Court to establish any national
standards on the issue.' 5 As a practical matter, however, the tests
used in the lower federal courts and the state courts have been
quite similar. Until recently, courts of most states and federal cir-
cuits had adopted a due process-based standard referred to various-
ly as the "sham, farce, or mockery" or the "farce and mockery"
standard.6 This standard placed a heavy burden on the defendant
to show that his counsel was so ineffective as to turn the trial into
a "mockery of justice."'7 Although many state'8 and federal' 9 courts
still apply variations of this standard, it has weaknesses, not the
least of which is its emphasis on the trial stage. Ineffectiveness
at other stages of the prosecutorial process may also impinge upon
13. Address by Judge Burger to the Winter Convention of the American College of Trial Lawyers (April
I1, 1967), printed in 5 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1968).
14. See generally Goodpaster, supra note 10 and Schwarzer, supra note 10.
15. On May 14, 1984, the United States Supreme Court adopted a standard for effective counsel. In Strickland
v. Washington, No. 82-1554 (U.S. May 14, 1984), the Court adopted a sixth amendment-based "reasonableness"
standard. Id. slip op. at 18-19. The high court specifically stated that "the minor differences in the lower courts'
precise formulations of the performance standards are insignificant: The different formulations are mere varia-
tions of the overarching reasonableness standard." Id. slip op. at 26. See also, Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 218,
226 (1976).
16. See generally Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1973) and
Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th 27 (1980) (excellent detailed discussion of the entire ineffectiveness issue and especially
of the standards that the various courts at the state level have applied).
17. Parham v. State, 229 So. 2d 582, 583 (Miss. 1969); see also Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th 27, 99 (1980).
18. See 2 A.L.R. 4th 27, 99 (1980).
19. See 26 A.L.R. FED. 218, 227-28 (1976).
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the defendant's rights, and the "farce and mockery" standard does
not adequately address those problem areas.
The current trend is clearly away from the due process type
of standard toward a sixth-amendment-based reasonableness test."°
The courts have expressed this standard by generally using the
words "effective" or "competent" to describe the desired perfor-
mance by counsel, but the standard is always based on
reasonableness. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
has used a standard of "counsel reasonably likely to render and
rendering reasonably effective assistance."2 The Supreme Court
of California has taken the position that the defendant must be
provided with reasonably competent assistance of an attorney act-
ing as a diligent and conscientious advocate." Each of these stand-
ards seems to require a two-pronged analysis of counsel's
performance: 1) Was counsel intrinsically competent or effective?
and 2) Did counsel in fact render reasonably competent or effec-
tive assistance?
Closely following the Fifth Circuit standard, Mississippi has
recently adopted a reasonableness test in the case of Callahan v.
State. 3 The Mississippi Supreme Court noted that several stan-
dards had been applied in this state over the years." In separate
decisions in 1969, for example, the court had approved a
reasonableness test2" and a "mockery of justice" test. ' The court
in Callahan"7 settled on the reasonableness standard cited in
Stewart v. State8 and used the language of the Fifth Circuit in
McKenna v. Ellis. 9 As a result, the test in Mississippi is whether
counsel is "reasonably likely to render" and does render
"reasonably effective assistance."" The court in Callahan went
on to state that the defendant who has demonstrated that his counsel
was in fact ineffective "must show that he was prejudiced in a
way that would not have come about had his rights been constitu-
tionally protected."31 Having thus settled, in February of 1983,
20. See Special Project, Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction: Principles for
Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 1, 37 (1977); see also Strickland v. Washington, No. 82-1554
(U.S. May 14, 1984).
21. McKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960).
22. People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 419, 590, P.2d 859, 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739, (1979).
23. 426 So. 2d 801 (Miss. 1983).
24. Id. at 804.
25. Stewart v. State, 229 So. 2d 53, 56 (Miss. 1969).
26. Parham v. State, 229 So. 2d 582, 583 (Miss. 1969).
27. 426 So. 2d 801, 804 (Miss. 1983).
28. 229 So. 2d 53, 56 (Miss. 1969).
29. 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960).
30. Callahan, 426 So. 2d at 804.
31. Id. at 805.
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on a substantive standard for gauging ineffective assistance of
counsel, it was natural for the court to turn its attention to the
procedural issues one month later.
C. Problems with the Mississippi Procedure Prior to Read v. State
Before the decision in Read, the Mississippi Supreme Court
examined ineffective assistance of counsel claims by direct ap-
peal of the conviction as well as by collateral attack. The direct
appeal route was most common, and the overwhelming majority
of these appeals were unsuccessful. 2 In more recent cases, the
issue was also raised by petition for writ of error coram nobis."
These challenges met with similarly unsuccessful results."4
A brief review of the literature will highlight some of the
theoretical and practical shortcomings of both methods. The direct
appeal procedure requires the court to determine entirely from
the trial record whether defense counsel was ineffective. This can
prove extremely difficult since the record is frequently inadequate
for a clear showing on the issue. 5 Another problem with direct
appeal is that the court is being asked to rule on a claimed error
often not properly preserved at the trial and which the trial court
has had no opportunity to consider. Obviously, the ineffective trial
counsel would seldom be expected to point out his own ineffec-
tiveness." Finally, the trial record may not, indeed probably will
not, adequately reflect those actions that counsel did or did not
32. Counsel was found not ineffective in the following cases: Hutchinson v. State, 391 So. 2d 637 (Miss.
1980): Buford v. State. 372 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1979); Warren v. State. 369 So. 2d 483 (Miss. 1979); Rogers
v. State. 307 So. 2d 551 (Miss. 1975): Miller v. State. 231 So. 2d 178 (Miss. 1970); Parham v. State, 229
So. 2d 582 (Miss, 1969); and Sims v. State, 209 Miss. 545, 47 So. 2d 849 (1950). But see Stewart v. State,
229 So. 2d 53 (Miss. 1969) (counsel found ineffective).
33. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-35-145 (1972). See also Nelson v. Tullos, 323 So. 2d 539 (Miss. 1975)
(explaining that the writ of error coram nobis is the proper vehicle for postconviction relief in Mississippi).
-In this jurisdiction relief for a defendant who claims to have been convicted as the result of a deprivation
of his constitutional rights is by writ of error coram nobis.' Id. at 543. The habeas corpus writ is virtually
useless for postconviction collateral attack in Mississippi; see Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-43-1 to -5 (1972) and
Nelson v. Tullos, 323 So. 2d 539, 542 (Miss. 1975) ("Unlike the boundless federal habeas corpus, the writ
for habeas corpus in Mississippi is narrow in its scope and applicability.').
34. See, e.g., Berry v. State, 45 So. 2d 613 (Miss. 1977) (counsel not ineffective) and Callahan v. State,
426 So. 2d 801 (Miss. 1983) (counsel not found to be ineffective, but leave granted to file a new petition for
writ of error coram nobis alleging specific acts supporting claim of ineffectiveness).
35. See Comment, Effective Representation - An Evasive Substantive Notion Masquerading as Procedure,
39 WASH. L. REV. 819, 836 (1965) (pointing out the problem of -record worship" on direct appeal and en-
couraging appellate courts to remand ineffective assistance claims for development of an adequate record, in-
cluding matters outside the trial). See also Schwarzer, supra note 10 at 642-43 (general discussion of the same
problem).
36. Read v. State, 430 So. 2d 832, 838 (Miss. 1983); See also Comment, Ineffective Counsel's Last Act
- Appeal?: An Ethical Dilemma of Conflicting Interests, 1979 ARIz. ST. L.J. 595, 605 n.58 (citing responses
to a survey of public defender offices).
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take outside the trial phase -actions that may be critical factors
in determining ineffectiveness.37
The collateral attack approach is no more helpful than direct
appeal, except that the collateral attack does open the possibility
of holding an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective counsel issue.'
However, the postconviction attack may come months or even
years after the original conviction and affirmance on appeal. The
court then may be forced to overturn a conviction, because of
ineffective trial counsel, at a time when the case cannot possibly
be retried due to loss of witnesses or evidence." In addition, allow-
ing a postconviction attack based on the ineffectiveness issue may
result in repetitive attacks, each claiming that the previous counsel
was ineffective in litigating the incompetence of his predecessor. '
Finally, an evidentiary hearing on the issue places the defendant's
trial counsel in the unenviable position of testifying adversely to
the interests of his former client or admitting his own in-
competence."1
D. Options Available to the Court
When the Mississippi Supreme Court was confronted with the
facts of Read v. State, a number of solutions were available for
the peculiar problems presented by an ineffectiveness claim.
Several commentators have recommended that the trial judge
should become more actively involved in guarding the defendant's
rights at all stages of the criminal proceedings.42 These writers
have suggested safeguards such as checklists" to guide criminal
lawyers and cautious intervention by the judge at any point dur-
ing the defendant's sojourn through the system." Other writers
have called for better education for criminal lawyers, coupled with
37. See Comment, supra note 35, at 837; see also Waltz, supra note 12, at 327; and Bines, Remedying
Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927, 939 (1973)
(both emphasizing the need to examine a broad range of factors outside the actual trial when evaluating ineffec-
tiveness claims).
38. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 10, at 355; Special Project, Ineffective Representation as a Basis
for Relief from Conviction: Principles for Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. Poas. 1, 87-88 (1977).
39. See, e.g., Walker v. Mitchell, 224 Va. 568, 299 S.E.2d 698 (1983); Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 646.
40. This problem has arisen in at least one state according to Comment, Repetitive Post-Conviction Peti-
tions Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Can the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Tame the 'Monster*?
20 DuQ. L. REv. 237 (1982) (citing multiple postconviction hearing requests by defendants claiming ineffec-
tiveness of counsel).
41. See generally Comment, Ineffective Counsel's Last Act-Appeal?: An Ethical Dilemma of Conflicting
Interests, 1979 Atuz. ST. L. 595.
42. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 10; Goodpaster, supra note 10; and Note, Identifying and Remedying
Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARv.
L. REv. 752 (1980).
43. See Finer, supra note 16, at 1119.
44. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 10, at 358; Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 649-65; and Note, supra
note 42, at 773.
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special examinations and periods of apprenticeship prior to be-
ing allowed to practice in the criminal courts.4' Arguably, the
supreme court would not have the means to effectuate all possi-
ble safeguards, but it could certainly make suggestions encouraging
appropriate decision makers to do so.
One commentator has proposed that ineffective counsel claims
should be heard in a single evidentiary hearing resembling a habeas
corpus proceeding. As a result of such a hearing, the court might
apply a variety of remedial actions including reversal and new
trial, civil damages, return of the fee paid to an appointed attorney,
or even contempt or disbarment action against the offending at-
torney.4'6 Even those commentators who decline to propose so
radical a solution almost unanimously favor providing some type
of evidentiary hearing on the matter. They acknowledge that some
means must be established whereby meritorious claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel will be properly resolved. A recur-
ring theme, at least implied in several articles, is that state courts
need an adequate relief mechanism because the defendant will
almost certainly turn to the federal courts with a collateral attack
on the state conviction."
The several courts that have recently dealt with the ineffec-
tiveness issue have adopted a variety of procedural approaches.
These courts can generally be classified into two main groups:
1) those that encourage collateral attack only, and 2) those that
allow both direct appeal and collateral attack. These groupings
are by no means fixed, and emerging from all of the cases is one
recurring theme: the reviewing court must have an adequate record
upon which to base its decision on the ineffectiveness issue.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has taken perhaps the most rigid
position with respect to ineffectiveness claims. In the case of
Walker v. Mitchell," that court made it clear that a claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel is not cognizable on direct appeal. 9
The court stated that "the ends of justice dictate the adoption of
a rule restricting to habeas corpus proceedings the litigation of
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel."" A similarly inflexi-
ble approach has been taken by the United States Court of Ap-
45. See Finer, supra note 16, at 1116-19.
46. See Bines, supra note 37, at 976-83.
47. Id. at 947-48.
48. 224 Va. 568, 299 S.E.2d 698 (1983).
49. Id. at 567, 299 S.E. 2d at 699.
50. Id.
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peals for the Eleventh Circuit. In United States v. Veteto, 1 the
court ruled that the defendant cannot raise the ineffectiveness issue
on direct appeal because "there has been no opportunity to develop
and include in the record evidence bearing on the merits of the
allegation.""
The Louisiana Supreme Court has also held in recent cases that
ineffectiveness claims should be heard after a habeas corpus hear-
ing to develop the issue. In the line of cases beginning with State
v. Marcel," in 1975, the Louisiana high court made it clear that
the writ of habeas corpus is the proper vehicle to use for an at-
tack on a conviction based on ineffective counsel. However, three
recent cases show that the Louisiana Supreme Court has retained
its discretion to review appropriate claims on direct appeal.5
Appellate courts in both Minnesota and Missouri favor the col-
lateral attack approach. In State v. Zerneche55 and State v.
Lehmann,56 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that it would
not consider the effectiveness of trial counsel on direct appeal.
The high court noted that the trial record was inadequate and stated
that they "[did] not have the benefit of all the facts concerning
why defense counsel did or did not do certain things." 7 Two dif-
ferent Missouri Courts of Appeals have specifically mentioned
the need for a postconviction motion on the issue so that the defense
counsel will have an opportunity to present his own evidence. 8
Both Missouri courts noted, however, that the ineffectiveness claim
can be disposed of on direct appeal where the trial record has suf-
ficient facts to allow a "meaningful review" of the issue. 9
Two other states have also chosen a flexible stance, but both
5I. United States v. Veteto, 701 F.2d 136 (11 th Cir.) (multiple defendants), cert. denied sub nor. Wescott
v. United States, 463 U.S. 1212 (1983) (each defendant separately petitioned for certiorari).
52. Veteto, 701 F.2d at 140. However, the same court modified its position somewhat in a similar case
decided shortly after Vereto. In United States v. Badolato, 701 F.2d 915 (11th Cir. 1983), the court of appeals
decided an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal where the trial court had already conducted a plenary hearing
on the issue prior to the appeal and that record was available to the court.
53. 320 So. 2d 195 (La. 1975); see also State ex rel. Bailey v. City of West Monroe, 418 So. 2d 570
(La. 1982): State v. Collins, 350 So. 2d 590 (La. 1977); State v. Ross, 343 So. 2d 722 (La. 1977); State v.
Mouton, 327 So. 2d 413 (La. 1976).
54. In State v. Seiss. 428 So. 2d 444 (La. 1983), the court found the trial record to be adequate and, in
the interest of judicial economy, disposed of the issue on direct appeal. The fact that this will rarely occur
is demonstrated by the almost simultaneous disposition of two other appeals. In State v. Rogers, 428 So. 2d
932 (La. 1983), and State v. Buckenburger, 428 So. 2d 966 (La. 1983), the Louisiana Supreme Court found
the record to be inadequate for a determination on the issue and reasserted that, even though such cases are
reviewable on direct appeal, the proper remedy is habeas corpus.
55. 304 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1981).
56. 331 N.W.2d 759 (Minn. 1983).
57. Zernechel, 304 N.W.2d at 367.
58. State v. Larrabee, 572 S.W.2d 250 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Linhart, 649 S.W.2d 530 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983).
59. Larrabee. 572 S.W.2d at 252.
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favor an evidentiary hearing in the trial court. In Hilliard v. State, 6
the Arkansas Supreme Court suggested that the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was best raised in a motion for new
trial or postconviction relief.6' The main benefit of such a pro-
cedure, according to that court, is to give the trial court an op-
portunity to "assess the quality of legal representation. '62 The
Maryland Court of Appeals ruled in Johnson v. State 3 and Har-
ris v. State" that the trial court is the proper forum for hearings
on the issue and that a postconviction proceeding is the appropriate
mechanism. The court found an evidentiary hearing and resul-
tant record to be absolutely necessary in order to allow the ap-
pellate court to "determine intelligently whether the attorney's
actions met the applicable standard of competence." 5
All of the courts mandating habeas corpus proceedings or other
postconviction relief have emphasized the need for an adequate
record in evaluating ineffectiveness claims. Toward that end, those
courts rely almost entirely on some type of postconviction eviden-
tiary hearing to develop that record. At least three other courts
have not gone so far toward foreclosing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims on direct appeal. However, even in the courts that
expressly allow such claims on direct appeal, there is a strong
tendency to refuse to decide the claim absent an evidentiary hear-
ing. In such cases, the dispositive factors seem to be the specific
nature and seriousness of the claimed ineffectiveness and the quali-
ty of the record before the reviewing court.
For example, California's Supreme Court has developed the rule
that where the record is adequate, an ineffectiveness claim may
be disposed of on direct appeal. In the important case of People
v. Pope, the court stated the rule but went on to say that where
the record sheds no light of explanation on counsel's actions, the
case will otherwise be resolved with leave of the defendant to file
a habeas corpus action.67 At the hearing on that action, all evidence
relating to the ineffective assistance of counsel can be developed. 8
In State v. Douglas,69 the Idaho Supreme Court likewise held
60. 259 Ark. 81, 531 S.W.2d 463 (1976).
61. Id. at 84, 531 S.W.2d at 464.
62. Id.
63. 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982).
64. 295 Md. 329, 455 A.2d 979 (1983).
65. Johnson, 292 Md. at 434-35, 439 A.2d at 559.
66. 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979). See Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th 27 (1980) (an
excellent annotation on the ineffective counsel issue).
67. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d at 429-30, 590 P.2d at 869, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
68. Id.
69. 97 Idaho 878, 555 P.2d 1145 (1976).
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that claims of ineffective counsel may be resolved on direct ap-
peal where the evidence is clear. Whereas the court ruled the claim
valid in Douglas, the court was able to determine from the record
in State v. Morris,7" that a similar claim was groundless. But, in
State v. Tucker,71 the Idaho high court was unable to make a deter-
mination based on the record and so remanded the case for fur-
ther evidentiary hearings on the issue.7"
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit was able to dispose of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim on direct appeal in the case of Godfrey v. United
States.73 While that court acknowledged the generally preferable
practice of bringing such claims under a motion that will result
in an evidentiary hearing, the court stated its willingness to han-
dle the claim on direct appeal.74 Here again, a major determinant
of the court's decision to resolve the issue on direct appeal is the
nature of the claim coupled with the adequacy of the record in
reflecting the merits of that claim.
Regardless of the procedural approach adopted, all of the courts
cited agree that an adequate record of defense counsel's actions
and the reasons for those actions is essential in determining whether
counsel's assistance was effective. If an evidentiary hearing is war-
ranted to develop that record, the courts will not hesitate to re-
quire such a hearing before adjudicating the claim. The courts
will allow the defendant to present evidence of counsel's ineffec-
tiveness not just during the trial stage but during all phases of
the criminal defense process.7 5 The Mississippi Supreme Court
acknowledged this need for an evidentiary hearing on the inef-
fectiveness issue by its decision in Read v. State.
THE INSTANT CASE
A. An Important Threshold Question
In Part II of the opinion in Read v. State, Justice Robertson,
70. 97 Idaho 420, 546 P.2d 375 (1976).
71. 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975).
72. Id. at 13, 539 P.2d at 565.
73. 454 A.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
74. Id. at 303.
75. In People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 424-25, 590 P.2d 859, 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732. 739 (1979), the
California Supreme Court went so far as to list certain basic duties of effective counsel at the pre-trial phase.
The list was provided for the guidance of courts holding hearings on the issue and it included the requirements
that: 1) counsel diligently and actively participate in effective preparation of defendant's case, 2) counsel in-
vestigate all possible defenses of fact and law, 3) counsel confer with his client soon and often, 4) counsel
advise his client of his rights and take action to preserve them, and 5) counsel seek defendant's release prior
to trial and file certain appropriate motions. Similar guidance on what constitutes effective counsel at other
phases of the criminal process is included in that opinion. In State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 13, 539 P.2d 556,
565 (1975), the Idaho high court also gave a lower court specific guidance on evidence to be adduced at a
hearing on the ineffectiveness issue. The court instructed the trial court to hear evidence -necessary for resolu-
tion of the factual issue." This included allowing the trial counsel to testify as to the representation he rendered.
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writing for eight members of the Mississippi Supreme Court,
first dealt with two important procedural issues related to the in-
effective assistance of counsel claim. The first of the issues was
the procedural bar rule. That matter had to be resolved before
the court could discuss the new procedure, and a substantial por-
tion of the decision was devoted to eliminating the rule as a bar
to this type of appeal.
The court first noted that normally the procedural bar rule would
prohibit the defendant from raising an issue on direct appeal that
had not been properly preserved in the trial court.77 Compelling
reasons were advanced to support the court's decision that the rule
should not apply to ineffectiveness claims."8 The opinion noted
that the defendant who is represented by ineffective counsel has
no meaningful opportunity to raise the issue at trial."9 Further,
the court cited Brooks v. State8" for the proposition that errors
affecting fundamental rights are exceptions to the procedural bar
rule." The court also noted the historical fact that the ineffec-
tiveness issue has been repeatedly raised and dealt with on direct
appeal without being preserved at trial."z Finally, the court cited
previous cases that have presented right to counsel claims via
postconviction proceedings even when the issue was never rais-
ed at the trial or on direct appeal." The court's conclusion was
that the rule must not be used to bar ineffectiveness claims sim-
ply because objections to counsel's effectiveness were not previous-
ly raised.
Nor would the court consider the claim to be waived by the
defendant, since he has never had a "meaningful and realistic op-
portunity to assert the right."" The court's reasoning on this issue
was based as much on reality and logic as on precedent, since
this was the first time the procedural bar and waiver issue had
been before the court on an ineffectiveness claim. As a practical
matter, the court can never be certain that the defendant has "in-
telligently and voluntarily" declined to assert his right to effec-
tive counsel." The court observed that the ineffective lawyer is
the very one charged with timely presentation of issues and ex-
76. Justice Dan Lee concurred in the result only; Read, 430 So. 2d at 842.
77. Read, 430 So. 2d at 838.
78. Id. at 836-37.
79. Id. at 837.
80. 209 Miss. 150, 46 So. 2d 94 (1950).
81. Id. at 155, 46 So. 2d at 97.
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planation of rights to his client. The burden would be on the defen-
dant to know that his counsel was ineffective and to raise the
issue.86 In addition, since the court is concerned with the totality
of counsel's performance, "the earliest sensible time to raise the
ineffectiveness issue is after the jury has returned its verdict." 7
Logically, then, the application of the waiver rule would work
"to deny the defendant a bite of an apple he is constitutionally
entitled to bite."88
The court concluded the discussion of the procedural bar/waiver
issue with an appeal to juridical logic. It noted that the access
to effective counsel is a right secured to the defendant. On the
other hand, the procedural rules under discussion are based upon
the state's "reasonable and legitimate interest" in judicial efficien-
cy." If rights must give way to mere interests, they cease to be
rights, and "[t]he right to effective assistance of counsel cannot
.. .be made less than a right." ' Therefore, the court cannot allow
claims of this nature to be prohibited by mere rules. Although
a defendant may be entitled to but one bite of the apple, "he is
constitutionally entitled to [that one] bite.""1
B. Mississippi's New Procedure
Having disposed of this important threshold issue, the court then
turned its attention to delineating a procedure that would best
secure the defendant's one bite of the apple. The court adopted
a procedural format similar to that used by several other jurisdic-
tions. However, the Mississippi procedure places a strong em-
phasis on the direct appeal route.
First, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised on direct appeal. '
If the record is sufficient to support the claimed ineffectiveness,
the court may reverse and remand as it did in Brooks v. State"'
and Stewart v. State."4
Second, where the issue is not clear from the trial record, as
was the case in Read, the reviewing court should first decide all
the other issues in the case. In the event of reversal of another
issue, the ineffectiveness claim becomes moot. Conversely, where
86. Id.
87. Id. at 839.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 840.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 841.
93. 209 Miss. 150, 46 So. 2d 94 (1950) (complete inaction by defense counsel).
94. 229 So. 2d 53 (Miss. 1969) (defense attorney did nothing at all for defendant until after the verdict).
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the court affirms on all the other issues, the conviction will be
affirmed without prejudice to the defendant's right to raise the
issue of ineffectiveness in a proper postconviction proceeding.
This was the result reached in Read."5 Even in this second situa-
tion, the court still might be able to decide the issue on its merits
where the parties stipulate that the record is adequate, and the
court finds that further evidence is not needed from the trial court
level. 96
Finally, if the reviewing court has otherwise affirmed and the
defendant pursues a postconviction remedy, certain procedures
will be invoked. The defendant's application for postconviction
relief must state a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. That claim will entitle the defendant to an evidentiary
hearing on the merits of his claim in the trial court in which he
was originally convicted. 7 The substantive standards in Callahan
v. State"8 will be applied when the defendant files for such postcon-
viction relief. These standards dictate that the defendant must cite
specific allegations of ineffectiveness occurring at the pretrial,
trial, or appeal stages." At the evidentiary hearing, then, the trial
judge will undertake two lines of inquiry. First, he must hear
evidence regarding whether the counsel was reasonably likely to
render reasonably effective assistance." Then the trial court must
inquire whether "counsel in fact rendered reasonably effective
assistance in that case."1"1 The result of that two-pronged inquiry
will be a decision by the trial court on the granting of postconvic-
tion relief, and that decision is, of course, subject to appeal.0"
The court anticipates that this new procedure will be efficient.
Many cases raising the ineffectiveness issue can be disposed of
on direct appeal. Of those that cannot be appealed directly, only
the cases which are otherwise affirmed will require an eviden-
tiary hearing. Even then, such a hearing will not result unless the
defendant pursues a proper postconviction remedy. 03 The court
concluded by reiterating that such a procedure is necessary because
"every convicted defendant has the absolute right to one mean-
95. 430 So. 2d at 841.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 426 So. 2d 801 (Miss. 1983).
99. Id. at 804-06. A similar requirement that the defendant must cite specific instances of ineffectiveness
was very recently adopted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Cronic, No. 82-660, slip
op. at 18 (U.S. May 14, 1984).
100. Callahan, 426 So. 2d at 804-05.
101. Id. at 805.
102. Read, 430 So. 2d at 842.
103. Id.
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ingful opportunity to present his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. ' " That absolute right includes one opportunity for
an evidentiary hearing on the issue."'5
CONCLUSION
The Mississippi Supreme Court has taken a progressive ap-
proach to resolving the difficult questions raised in a defendant's
claim of ineffective counsel. The new procedure outlined in Read
v. State emphasizes the role of direct appeal, but the absolute right
to an evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness issue, characteristic
of the progressive trend in other jurisdictions, is preserved. By
adopting a procedure that allows direct appeals while providing
for evidentiary hearings when necessary, the court maximizes the
advantages of each route.
One important question not answered by Read v. State involves
the defendant's right to have appointed counsel while seeking
postconviction relief after his appeal. As recently as November,
1982, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed a trial judge's
refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent prisoner seeking postcon-
viction relief."o In Neal v. State, the indigent defendant had re-
quested court appointed counsel to assist him in filing a petition
for writ of error coram nobis. The high court ruled that, while
the defendant does have the right to appointed counsel at trial and
on appeal, he does not have such a right in discretionary or col-
lateral proceedings.""' An indigent defendant might find his ap-
peal affirmed without prejudice to his right to seek postconviction
relief based on an ineffectiveness claim such as in Read. And yet,
under Neal, that same defendant might have the postconviction
avenue effectively closed due to lack of appointed counsel to guide
him. Since the court has stated that the defendant has an absolute
right to pursue the ineffectiveness issue via postconviction remedy,
it seems likely that the Neal holding will have to be modified in
the future to allow the defendant to have appointed counsel to pro-
tect that right. The presence of appointed counsel at the eviden-
tiary hearing on the ineffectiveness claim appears to be a necessary
adjunct to securing this important right.
Another question that may arise as a result of the Read deci-
sion is similarly vexing. How many times may the defendant assert
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim? Assuming a defen-
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Neal v. State, 422 So. 2d 747 (Miss. 1982).
107. Id. at 748.
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dant complied with the new procedure, may he not then go back
and challenge the effectiveness of the attorney who represented
him on his appeal and at the evidentiary hearing? Each time the
defendant asserts the claim, he would be attempting to show that,
due to a series of ineffective attorneys, he has never actually had
an opportunity to show that his trial counsel was ineffective. Such
a "revolving door" situation has arisen in at least one state which
guaranteed a postconviction hearing on the ineffectiveness issue. °"
The Mississippi Supreme Court may need to give additional
guidance to the trial courts conducting the evidentiary hearings,
in order to reduce or eliminate the possibility that such a hearing
will not be a final settlement of the issue. 1c
The court's decision in Read v. State is certainly not a panacea
to solve all the problems caused by ineffective assistance of
counsel. No single case can cover all the possibilities. However,
the new procedure established in this case is an improvement over
the previous piecemeal system in helping to secure defendant's
one bite of the constitutional apple.
Kent McDaniel
108. See Comment, supra note 39.
109. The court might instruct the trial court judges to intervene more freely in such hearings to ensure that
defendant's counsel at that hearing is effective. Such intervention would be far less objectionable in this context
than in the original trial. The Mississippi Supreme Court has used a similar procedure in instructing trial judges
to ensure the trial record reflects that defendant did not desire to testify in his own behalf. See Culberson v.
State, 412 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Miss. 1982).

